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Successor Liability
in Illinois
When can creditors and
tort victims sue the buyer
of a business for the debts
and torts of the seller? This
article discusses Illinois
case law on the doctrine of
successor liability.

S

sells assets to another entity, those assets are
to the
exception
is an
liability
uccessor
transferred
free and
clear
of all but
validgeneral
liens rule
and security interests. When successor liability is imposed, a
creditor or plaintiff with a claim against the seller may assert
that claim against and collect payment from the purchaser.
Historically, successor liability was a flexible doctrine, designed to eliminate harsh results from strict application of corporate law. Over time, however, as successor liability doctrines evolved, they became ossified in many
jurisdictions. Corporate lawyers and those who structure transactions learned
how to avoid successor liability doctrines.'
This article summarizes what has become of various species of non-statutory successor liability in Illinois.2

Background
Successor liability doctrines are both judge-made (the "common law" ex-

By George W. Kuney

1. See George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 Fla St U Bus L Rev 9
(2006), also available at http://www.law.utk.edu/FACULTY/KuneyffaxandEvalOfSuddLia.pdf.
2. A detailed jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis and explanation of the state of judge-made successor liability law can be found at http://www.law.utk.edulFACULTY/Kuney/AppendixTaxonomy
I0-15-07.pdf. The author updates this analysis regularly so that it remains current.

George W Kuney is a W P. Toms Professor of Law and Directorof the
Clayton Center for EntrepreneurialLaw at The University of Tennessee
College of Law. He is the author of a number of law review and other articles
dealing with business, contracts, Chapter 11, and insolvency issues.
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Intentional (express or implied)
assumption of liabilities
Intentional assumption of liabilities,
express or implied, is probably the simplest of the successor liability species.
Imposing liability on a successor that
by its actions is shown to have assumed
liabilities is essentially in the realm of

contract law, drawing on doctrines of
construction and the objective theory
of contract.' In the absence of any such
terms the default rule that the purchaser
does not assume any liability applies.
In determining whether the successor corporation assumed the liabilities
of the predecessor, the Illinois courts
"are nevertheless governed by the express provisions of the written document
which dictates the agreement between
the parties."'

3. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing
Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between
Form and Substance, 60 Bus Law 109 (2004).
4. See Savage Arms, Inc v Western Auto Supply
Co, 18 P3d 49 (SC Alaska 2001) (discussing varied approaches to determination of whether successor liability
was a creature of contract and corporate law or tort
law as part of its choice of law analysis and concluding
that successor liability is a tort doctrine designed to
expand products liability law; collecting cases and other
authorities on both sides of the issue).
5. The variance in states' approaches to successor
liability and to the related doctrines of alter ego or
piercing the corporate veil are one of the reasons that
the federal courts have adopted a uniform federal common law of these subjects under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA). See United States v General
Battery Corp, Inc, 423 F3d 294, 298-301 (3d Cir 2005)
(collecting authorities).

Fraudulent schemes
to escape liability
The next species of successor liability is based
on fraud. Perpetrators of
Succes sor liability is an exception
fraudulent schemes to esrule that when one entity
cape liability by using corsells assets to another entity the
porate law limitation-of-liability principles to defeat
transfer is free and clear
the legitimate interests of
creditors are typically subof e verything but valid liens
ject to successor liability.o
and security interests.
If a corporation's equity
holders, for example, arrange for the company's
assets to be sold for less
6. Vernon v Schuster, 179 Ill 2d 338, 345-46, 688
than market value to a new company NE2d 1172, 1175-76 (1997); Community Ins Servs
in which they also hold a stake, the v United Life Ins Co, 2007 WL 2710495 *3 (SD Ill
2007). Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc v Latini-Hohlegitimate interests of the company's berger Dhimantec, 476 F Supp 2d 913 (ND Ill 2007);
creditors have been frustrated." By mak- Joseph Hubber Brewing Co, Inc v Pamado, Inc, 2007
2583719 *8-9 (ND Ill 2006); Muniz v Rexnord,
ing the successor corporation liable in WL
2006 WL 3210463 at *3 (ND Ill 2006); Consol Servs
such instances, the creditors' interests and Const, Inc v S. R. McGuire Builder and Gen Con329, 854 NE2d 715,
are respected. The challenge, of course, tractor, Inc, 367 Ill App 3d 324,
720 (1st D 2006); MacDonaldv Hinton, 361 Ill App 3d
is defining the standard that separates 378, 836 NE2d 893 (1st D 2005); Flandersv California
the fraudulent scheme from the legiti- Coastal Communities, Inc, 356 Ill App 3d 1113, 1118,
828 NE2d 793, 798 (5th D 2005); Chatham Surgicore,
mate one.
Ltd v Health CareServ Corp, 356 Ill App 3d 795, 826
Illinois courts have not developed a NE2d 970 (1st D 2005); Brandon v Anesthesia & Pain
Asso Ltd, 419 F3d 594 (7th Cir 2005).
test for the fraud exception. However, Mgmt
7. Nilsson v ContinentalMach Mfg Co, 251 Ill App
in Myers v Putzmeister, the first district 3d 415, 418, 621 NE2d 1032, 1035 (2d D 1993); see
held that there was no evidence of fraud also Green v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, Inc, 122 Ill
3d 204, 212, 460 NE2d 895, 901 (2d D 1984)
in the transaction sub judice "notwith- App
(refusing to adopt the rationale of the Turner (note
standing the disparity between the value 24) line of cases but confusing the Turner continuity of
enterprise exception with the product line exception).
of the predecessor's debts and assets.""
8. Michael J. Zaino, Bielagus v EMRE: New HampUnder Illinois law, it is not necessary to shire Rejects Expansion of Traditional Test for Corposhow the existence of a majority of the rate Successor Liability Following an Asset Purchase,
45 NH Bar J 26 (2004).
11 badges of fraud listed in the fraudu9. Myers v Putzmeister, 232 Ill App 3d 419, 424,
596 NE2d 754, 756 (1st D 1992); Kehrer Bros Const,
lent conveyance statute."
De facto merger
In a statutory merger, the successor
corporation becomes liable for the predecessor's debts. 4 The de facto merger
theory of successor liability imposes the
same result for an asset sale that is like
a statutory merger except for the continuity of liability, so that form doesn't
triumph over substance.
The main difference between the sub-

Inc v Custom Body Co, 2008 WL 182503 *4 (SD Ill
2008); Pamado, 2006 WL 2583719 *9.
10. Pamado, 2006 WL 2583719 *9, citing Vernon v
Schuster, 179 Ill 2d 338, 688 NE2d 1172 (1997).
11. Causation is a required element of all species
of the fraud exception. See, for example, Milliken
Co v Duro Textiles, LLC, 19 Mass L Rep 509 (2005)
(discussing need for causation, but also that judgment
creditors could look to company's long term prospects,
not just immediate insolvency).
12. Myers at 424, 596 NE2d at 756.
13. Brandon v Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt Assocs Ltd,
419 F3d 594 (2005).
14. G. William Joyner, Ill, Beyond Budd Tire: Examining Successor Liability in North Carolina, 30 Wake
Forest L Rev 889, 894 (1995).
&

ceptions) and statutory. Both represent
a public policy that, in certain instances
and for certain liabilities, the general rule
of non-liability of a successor for a predecessor's debts following an asset sale
should not apply. This article addresses
the status of the first group, judge-made
successor liability in Illinois.
Judge-made successor liability is a
product of the rise of corporate law in
the last half of the 19th century and
early part of the 20th century. It appears
to have developed because of and in
reaction to the rise of corporate law. It is
probably better classified as a corporatelaw doctrine, like "alter ego" or "piercing the corporate veil,"' rather than as a
creature of tort law, although it is used
by involuntary tort claimants.
Authorities list four to six situations
in which judge-made successor liability
has been recognized: (1) express or implied assumption, (2) fraud, (3) de facto
merger, (4) mere continuation, (5) continuity of enterprise, and (6) product line.4
In fact, the matter is more complicated
than that. Each species of successor liability comprises different sub-species
with different standards in the jurisdictions that recognize them.
Some use a list of mandatory elements while others are based on a nonexclusive list of factors to be weighed in
a "totality of the circumstances" fashion.
Some that began as a flexible list of
factors have evolved into mandatory elements. In any event, to state that there
are only four, five, or six categories is to
oversimplify the matter.'
When examined in detail, the types
of successor liability can be classified
into five general species, each of which is
specifically defined on a jurisdiction-byjurisdiction basis. The four categories of
successor liability recognized in Illinois'
and addressed in this article are: (1)
intentional assumptions of liabilities, (2)
fraudulent schemes to escape liability,
(3) de facto mergers, and (4) the "mere
continuation" continuity exception. The
fifth category, the product-line exception, has consistently been rejected by
Illinois courts.'
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SUCCESSOR LIABILITY | Continued
species of de facto merger in various
jurisdictions is how rigid or flexible the
test is. In other words, how many of the
elements that indicate a de facto merger
must be present before the doctrine
applies and the successor business is
liable? On one end of the spectrum is the
lengthy, mandatory checklist of required
elements; on the other is a non-exclusive
list of factors to be weighed in a totalityof-the-circumstances fashion.

(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of
the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business
operations of the seller corporation."

Continuation of the business:
"mere continuation"
An exception with two distinct subcategories permits successor liability
when the successor continues the business of the seller. The subcategories are "mere continuation" and "continuity
of enterprise."

The purpose of the doct rifle
was to provide creditors with
recourse against a succe ssor
entity when the predece ssor
was judgment-proof

In Nilsson v Continental Machine
Mfg Co, the second district noted that,

as under the mere continuation exception, continuity of ownership is a prerequisite for imposing liability under the
de facto merger exception." The court
noted that the mere-continuation and

de facto merger exceptions are similar
but apply in different circumstances: the
former when no corporation existed before the asset purchase, the latter when
two existing corporations are combined
in the sale."6 Besides stating this obvious
difference, the Nilsson court provided no
guidance on the contours of the de facto
merger exception.
In another decision by the first dis-

trict, the court stated the following "elements" of a de facto merger:
(1) There is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets and
general business operations.
(2) There is continuity of shareholders which results from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this
stock ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so
that they become a constituent part of the
purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its
ordinary business operations, liquidates
and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
150 I ILLINOIS
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The two share roughly

the same indications. The
difference:

continuity

of

enterprise does not require
continuity of shareholders
or directors or officers between the predecessor and
the successor. That requirement is one of the merecontinuation exception's
dispositive elements or
factors." The continuityof-enterprise doctrine, however, has not
been adopted in Illinois.
Under Illinois law, continuity of ownership is a threshold requirement of the
mere-continuation exception but it is
unclear from state court opinions what
other factors are relevant." Federal district courts in Illinois have applied factors based on other federal opinions such
as continued existence of transferring
entity, adequate consideration, continuity of personnel and employees, the successor operating under a similar name
to that of predecessor, and the successor
holding itself out as a continuation of the
predecessor.20
In Vernon v Schuster, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a corporation or
partnership that purchases the assets of a
sole proprietorship where the proprietor
is deceased cannot possibly be a continuation of the former business because the
sole proprietor's death means that there
is no continuity of ownership.2 1
The dissent in Vernon argued that
continuity of ownership should be only
one of several factors that the court
considers under the mere continuity exception.2 2 The seventh circuit has held,
citing Vernon, that successor liability
may lie under the mere-continuation exception even if the predecessor has not
2
dissolved. 3
Despite the strict requirement of con-

tinuity of ownership required by the Vernon majority, some courts have found
such continuity in surprising situations
such as with transfers between family
members and in cases where the owners
of the predecessor have a significantly
reduced ownership in the successor."
Illinois courts have noted the similarity between the mere continuation
and de facto merger doctrines, but it
was determined that the two are distinguishable: "[t]he mere continuation
exception applies where a corporate
reorganization has taken place, so that
the corporation has simply 'put on a
new coat.' A merger, on the other hand,
involves the combining of two existing
corporations into a single successor
corporation.""

Conclusion
This article and its more detailed companion on the author's website (http://
www.law.utk.edu/FACULTY/Kuney/
kuney.htm) attempt to detail some of the
history and the current condition of successor liability law in Illinois.
The purpose of the doctrine was to
provide contract and tort creditors with

recourse against a successor entity when
the predecessor that contracted with
them or committed the tort had sold
the assets and was no longer a source
of recovery. Its various species acted as
a relief valve on the strict limitation of
liability created by corporate law.
The doctrine is "equitable" in nature
to the extent that it comes into play
when strict application of corporate law
would offend the conscience of the court.
In large part, the doctrine remains intact
and still serves that purpose. U
15. Nilsson at 418, 621 NE2d at 1035.
16. Id at 417, 621 NE2d at 1034.
17. Myers at 423, 596 NE2d at 756 (internal citations omitted).
18. Rest 3d Torts-PL S12, Comment g; Am L Prod
Liab 3d S 7:20 (2004).
19. Vernon at 346, 688 NE2d at 1176; Kehrer, 2008
WL 182503 *11.
20. UnitedStates Commodity Future's TradingCommission v Lake Shore Asset Mgmt, 2007 WL 2659990
*21 (ND Ill 2007); Pamado, 2006 WL 2583719 *8.
21. Vernon at 346, 688 NE2d at 1176.
22. Id at 351, 668 NE2d at 1178 (Bilandic dissenting).
23. Brandon v Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt Assocs Ltd,
419 F3d 594, 598-99 (7th Cir 2005) (finding that the
predecessor was being preserved in a "ghostly existence" by the successor precisely to defeat a finding of
continuity for successor liability purposes).
24. Pamado, 2006 WL 2583719 *12.
25. Nilsson at 418, 621 NE2d at 1034 (citations
omitted); Dileo v Vi-Jon Laboratories, Inc, 2007 WL
2317247 '2 (ND Ill 2007).

